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We explore how the introduction of explicit deposit insurance affects deposit flows into and out of 
banks of varying risk levels. Using evidence from a natural experiment in Russia, we employ a dif-
ference-in-difference estimator to isolate the change in the deposit flows of a newly insured group 
(households) relative to an uninsured “control” group (firms). This approach improves on earlier 
studies seeking to identify the effect of deposit insurance on market discipline. We find that the rel-
ative sensitivity of households to bank capitalization diminished markedly with the introduction of 
an insurance program covering their deposits. This was not true for firms, however. We then show 
the finding is not an artifact of the two groups responding differently to a minor banking crisis that 
arose at roughly the same time. 
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Työssä analysoidaan, kuinka talletusvakuutuksen käyttöönotto vaikuttaa talletusvirtoihin sellaisissa 
pankeissa,  joiden  riskitasot  poikkeavat  toisistaan.  Tutkimus  käyttää  aineistoa  ja  luonnollista 
koeasetelmaa Venäjän taloudesta. Erojen erotus (differences in differences) -estimaattori erottelee 
muutoksen uuden vakuutetun ryhmän talletuksissa (kotitaloudet) suhteessa vakuuttamattomaan kon-
trolliryhmään  (yritykset).  Tämä  metodologia  on  parannus  aiemmissa  tutkimuksissa  käytettyyn 
tapaan, jolla on tutkittu talletusvakuutuksen vaikutusta markkinakuriin. Tutkimustulosten mukaan 
kotitalouksien suhteellinen herkkyys pankkien pääomien suhteen pieneni merkittävästi, kun niiden 
talletukset kattava vakuutus otettiin käyttöön. Sama havainto ei kuitenkaan päde yrityksiin. Tutki-
muksessa osoitetaan myös, että tulos ei johdu siitä, että kaksi ryhmää olisi reagoinut eri tavalla 
samaan aikaan tapahtuneeseen pieneen pankkikriisiin.  
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1  Introduction  
 
 
Architects of modern financial safety nets are challenged by the possibility that their measures to 
mitigate bank failures may weaken other forces that buttress banking sector stability (Calomiris, 
1999). The introduction of explicit deposit insurance presents just such a dilemma. On one hand, it 
has the potential of stabilizing economies by limiting bank runs. This obvious benefit helps explain 
the ubiquitous adoption of explicit deposit insurance schemes across OECD countries and its spread 
in recent years to remote corners of the developing world (Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane, 2002).1  On 
the other hand, if depositors are lulled into complacency by the belief they are immune to the co n-
sequences of institutional failure, the disincentives that normally would prevent their banks from 
engaging in excessive risk-taking may weaken and decrease market discipline. 
 The degree to which depositors are involved in disciplining the market and the extent to 
which such behavior is curtailed by explicit deposit insurance are questions that should be possible 
to resolve simply by looking at the empirical record. Yet the data available to previous studies have 
made it difficult for researchers to cleanly identify and isolate the deposit insurance effect . Most 
published studies rely on comparisons of uninsured and insured depositors and attribute behavioral 
differences to the impact of insurance, an approach that ignores other ch aracteristics that may vary 
across depositor groups in explaining the observe d differences in behavior.  A smaller group of 
studies infer the impact of d eposit insurance on market discipline by comparing the behavior of a 
well-defined group before and after the introduction of deposit insurance. This approach cannot 
dismiss the possibility that results are driven by time-specific factors other than the introduction of 
insurance. 
We are fortunate to have at our disposal data from what effectively amounts to a natural 
experiment that allows us to explore whether and how the introduction of explicit deposit insurance 
affected deposit flows into and out of banks of varying risk levels. In 2004, Russia imposed a co m-
prehensive deposit insurance scheme to cover household deposits, while excluding deposits of 
firms. As the bank-level data report these two categories separately and cover the periods preceding 
and following the scheme’s introduction, we can apply a difference-in-difference estimator to iden-
                                                 
1 The United States introduced the first national system of deposit insurance in 1934. Recent years 
have witnessed a rapid expansion in its use. In 1995, 49 countries offered explicit deposit insurance. 
By 2003, the number had risen to 87 (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and Laeven, 2008). Alexei Karas, William Pyle and Koen Schoors   The effect of deposit insurance on Market Disipline: 
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tify the effect of the policy on households. Using firm deposits as a benchmark, we filter out the ef-
fect of any time-specific factors that could influence the behavior of all depositors in a similar man-
ner from the post-deposit-insurance change in household depositor behavior. Our results demon-
strate a noteworthy reduction in the relative market-disciplining behavior of households. 
We next consider whether this finding might be explained in part or whole by a time-
specific factor that impacts the two depositor groups differently. At about the same time Russia in-
troduced deposit insurance in 2004, the country suffered a minor banking crisis. Earlier studies sug-
gest banking crises may provide depositors with a “wake-up call” on the risks of bank insolvency 
(Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001). In the interest of cleanly identifying the effect of deposit 
insurance, we therefore compare the relative market-disciplining behavior of firms and households 
in the aftermath of the 2004 crisis against the behavior of these groups in the preceding 1998 finan-
cial meltdown. Following the 1998 crisis, both households and firms demonstrated comparable in-
creases in market discipline, evidence consistent with the “wake-up call” effect. Following the 2004 
crisis, however, the market-disciplining behavior of uninsured firms increased, while that of newly 
insured households did not. The difference in relative disciplining behaviors across crises, we argue, 
arises directly from the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme. 
Our findings contribute to the literature on market discipline and deposit insurance in two 
ways. First, the data allow us to carry out what we believe to be the cleanest assessment ever on the 
direct impact of deposit insurance on market discipline. Our findings should bolster or challenge 
research that posits an implicit relationship between deposit insurance and market discipline and 
help explore downstream linkages in a potential causal chain leading from deposit insurance to 
banking crises. Suggested linkages include market discipline and bank risk (Nier and Baumann, 
2006), deposit insurance and bank risk (Ioannidou and Penas, 2008), and deposit insurance and 
banking crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). 
Second, we contribute to the literature on the effect of banking crises on market discipline 
by comparing the behaviors of insured and uninsured depositors. As Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and 
Laeven (2008) observe, explicit deposit insurance programs are often introduced or expanded dur-
ing periods of financial crisis. Given the recent global downturn, understanding the combined effect 
of crises and deposit insurance on subsequent market disciplining behavior has broad implications 
to those designing financial market institutions. 
Our article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior research on the relationship be-
tween deposit insurance and deposit-market discipline and the downstream effects of both on bank 
risk and financial crises. Section 3 reviews the relevant histories of deposit markets and deposit in- 
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surance in Russia. Sections 4 and 5, respectively, introduce our data and methodological approach 
for identifying the effect of deposit insurance on market discipline. Section 6 presents our results 
and Section 7 presents an extended robustness check in which we extend the time co vered by our 
analysis to compare the effects of the 1998 and 2004 crises. Section 8 offers concluding thoughts. 
 
2   Deposit insurance, market discipline and bank risk 
 
Depositors are in no position to provide market discipline unless they have access to information on 
bank risk and expect to bear some of the costs of bank insolvency. Researchers began looking for 
evidence of market discipline in uninsured niches of markets with a well-developed informational 
infrastructure, i.e. where the above conditions appeared most clearly met. Investigating partially un-
insured large deposits in the United States, Park and Peristiani (1998) demonstrate a negative rela-
tionship between thrifts’ predicted probability of failure and the subsequent growth of their large 
uninsured deposits. Others turned up links between U.S. institutions’ cost of funds in one period 
and their prior-period measures of depositor risk: low capital-assets ratios; high variability of return 
on assets; higher percentages of bad loans and, generally, lower return on assets; and greater expo-
sure to junk bonds (Brewer and Mondschean, 1994; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Park and Peristi-
ani, 1998).  
Among this first generation of articles, the paper of Park and Peristiani (1998) stands out as 
it compares the propensity of uninsured and insured depositors to provide market discipline.2 Given 
the latter’s potential interest in monitoring the behavior of their banks as well, such comparison 
provides a better sense than an exclusive focus on the uninsured  as to how the introduction of ex-
plicit insurance affects disciplining behavior. Indeed, the authors find that measures of risk have an 
adverse effect on the growth and pricing of small insured deposits, although to a lesser extent than 
on large, partially insured deposits. The difference in disciplining behavior is attributed implicitly to 
the introduction of deposit insurance.    
                                                 
2 Insured depositors may feel compelled to monitor their banks if the insurer’s guarantee is not iron-
clad or if they face a cost to recovering funds from a failed institution. Cook and Spellman (1994) 
show that deposits at institutions insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 
were sensitive to risk measures such as the leverage ratio during a period when the guarantor had 
been declared insolvent. Alexei Karas, William Pyle and Koen Schoors   The effect of deposit insurance on Market Disipline: 
Evidence from a natural experiment on deposit flows 
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Analyzing the behavior of small insured deposits and large uninsured deposits in Argentina 
and Chile, Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) explicitly present the comparison as a test of de-
posit insurance’s effect on market discipline. They find that both types of deposits are sensitive to 
bank risk. Unlike Park and Peristiani (1998), they uncover little discernible difference between the 
disciplining behaviors of the two types of depositor. Explicit deposit insurance apparently had little 
or  no  effect  in  these  Latin  American  countries,  so,    the  researchers  conjecture,  the  protection 
schemes probably lacked credibility among depositors. 
As a test of the effect of explicit deposit insurance on market-disciplining behavior, how-
ever, the approach adopted by Park and Peristiani (1998) and Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) 
presents problems. Notably, small insured depositors may be different from large uninsured deposi-
tors in unobservable ways conceivably related to market discipline. Larger depositors, for instance, 
may be more risk averse or more informed about bank fundamentals than small depositors. As a 
result, comparison of the contemporaneous behavior of these groups does help in predicting how a 
given group of depositors is likely to engage in market discipline with the introduction of an explicit 
insurance scheme. 
Another approach that has been taken to infer the effect of deposit insurance on market 
discipline exploits comprehensive bank-level data and a recently compiled cross-country dataset of 
deposit insurance policies. Controlling for the presence of explicit insurance in a sample of 30 
OECD and developing countries from 1990-1997, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) uncover a 
negative relationship between the implicit cost of bank funds and prior-period measures of bank 
capitalization, profitability, and liquidity. They further demonstrate that explicit deposit insurance 
significantly reduces interest-rate sensitivity to these measures of bank risk. In deposit growth re-
gressions on a larger group of countries, better capitalized banks are found to be more successful in 
attracting deposits. In the presence of explicit deposit insurance, however, this relationship is muted 
− a result consistent with weakened market discipline. As with within-country comparisons of in-
sured and uninsured depositors (Park and Peristiani, 1998; Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001), 
this cross-country approach (which covers a period in which only two of the countries in the sample 
introduced explicit deposit insurance) relies on inferring the market-disciplining effect of explicit 
deposit insurance from a potentially diverse group of depositors. Depositors in countries that al-
ready have explicit deposit insurance may be fundamentally different on average from those in 
countries in which it has not been introduced. It is even possible that a country’s policy with respect 
to deposit insurance is endogenous to the behavioral predispositions of its depositors.  
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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To avoid drawing conclusions from a comparison of fundamentally different depositor 
groups, a test for the effect of deposit insurance on market discipline should compare the behavior 
of a given group of depositors before and after the explicit insurance scheme’s introduction. Using 
Bolivian data from 1998-2003, the unpublished study of Ioannidou and de Dreu (2006) finds that 
the magnitude of the coefficients designed to proxy for market discipline shrank notably after the 
introduction of explicit deposit insurance in 2001. By providing a “before-and-after” comparison 
for a specific group of depositors, their approach provides more direct evidence of deposit insur-
ance’s effect on market discipline than earlier studies. However, they cannot fully control for time-
varying, macro-level factors that can influence market discipline. Thus, they are unable to rule out 
the possibility that the apparent post-deposit-insurance reduction in market discipline is at least 
partly (if not wholly) the result of an unobserved macro-level factor confined either to the pre- or 
post-insurance period. 
Recognizing a potential causal chain from the introduction of deposit insurance to the re-
duction of market discipline to an increase in bank moral hazard to an increase in banking sector 
instability, several related studies effectively assume the first link and look for evidence of antici-
pated relationships between other links.3 Nier and Baumann (2006) demonstrate that banks more  
prone to be disciplined (e.g. they rely more on uninsured liabilities or face greater disclosure r e-
quirements) carry larger capital buffers that make them inherently more stable. Ioannidou and Penas 
(2008) show that Bolivian banks were more likely to init iate riskier loans after the introduction of 
deposit insurance. In a cross-country study, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) determine that 
generous insurance schemes are related to a greater likelihood of banking crises, particularly in 





                                                 
3 Exploring causation in the opposite direction, Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and Laeven (2008) use cross-
country panel data to demonstrate that countries experiencing banking crises are more likely to i n-
troduce deposit insurance. 
4 Gropp and Vesala (2004) lay out a model using corroborating evidence from the European Union 
that suggests a policy of explicit insurance acts as a commitment device to limit coverage only to 
those parties explicitly covered. By increasing the monitoring incentives of parties that may other-
wise consider themselves implicitly insured, explicit insurance can actually reduce moral hazard. Alexei Karas, William Pyle and Koen Schoors   The effect of deposit insurance on Market Disipline: 
Evidence from a natural experiment on deposit flows 
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3  Deposit markets and deposit insurance in Russia 
 
Russia has less than two decades the experience with liberalized deposit markets.5 Indeed, this rela-
tively short period in which to develop institutions that facilitate depositor monitor ing probably ex-
plains why Barth et al. (2004, 2006) ranked Russia in the bottom quintile of more than 100 cou n-
tries on their private-sector monitoring (PSM) index, a measure meant to capture the quality of i n-
stitutions that facilitate deposit market discipline.6 Although the ranking raises questions about the 
ability of Russian depositors to monitor and discipline banks, it provides no sense of whether they 
might feel compelled to do so. A review of Russia’s post-communist financial sector development, 
however, suggests the intensity of this interest should not be underestimated. 
At the start of development of financial markets in the early 1990s, bank deposits, particu-
larly those of households, were held almost exclusively by Sberbank, the state-owned savings bank. 
Lax entry policies in the early post-communist period contributed to quick emergence of a competi-
tive market for deposits. By 1994, private banks had captured over half of the household deposit 
market. A volatile mix of liberalized deposit rates, naïve depositors, and over-burdened regulators 
led to system-wide crises, including the massive financial meltdown in 1998 that saw many of the 
Russia’s largest retail banks go insolvent. Obligations to tens of thousands of depositors went unmet 
(Perotti, 2003; Radaev, 2000; Schoors, 2001; Spicer and Pyle, 2002). These experiences quickly 
heightened awareness of average Russians of the private costs of bank failure and the value of care-
fully monitoring their financial institutions. 
In Karas et al. (forthcoming), we demonstrate that in the half-decade after the 1998 crisis 
and before the introduction of explicit deposit insurance, market discipline in Russia became fairly 
sophisticated. Flows of household and firm deposits during this period were consistent with quan-
                                                 
5 The first part of this section draws on a similar discussion in Karas et al. (2009). 
6 The following considerations are factored positively into a country’s score on the PSM index: (1) 
whether a certified external audit of the bank’s financial statement is required; (2) whether all of the 
ten biggest banks are rated by international rating agencies; (3) whether income statements include 
accrued or unpaid interest or principal on non-performing loans and whether banks are required to 
produce consolidated financial statements; (4) whether off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the 
public; (5) whether banks must disclose risk management procedures to the public; and (6) whether 
subordinated debt is allowable as a part of regulatory capital. The version of the PSM index pre-
sented in Barth et al. (2006) is slightly modified to include the percentage of the ten biggest banks 
rated by domestic rating agencies. As there is no entry for Russia in this sub-category, its PSM in-
dex is not reported. The authors’ measures of bank transparency paint a similar picture. With re-
spect to quality of bank audit regime and pace in adopting best-practice accounting standards, Rus-
sia ranks among the bottom third of countries surveyed.  
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tity-based sanctioning of weaker banks. Thus, poorly capitalized banks were less successful in a t-
tracting the deposits of households and firms. On the other hand, the evidence is weak for the stan-
dard form of price discipline (depositors requiring a deposit rate premium from less stable banks).7 
This combination of findings, we argue, is consistent with households and firms interpreting the de-
posit rate as a complementary proxy of otherwise unobserved bank-level risk. Testing this hypothe-
sis, we estimate the deposit supply function and show that, particularly for poorly capitalized banks, 
deposit rate increases exhibited diminishing, and eventually negative, returns in terms of deposit 
attraction (i.e. a backward bending deposit supply curve).8 
Russia’s Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) was created as an independent agency in Janu-
ary 2004 and given responsibility for administering the national deposit insurance fund. The DIA 
was charged with determining bank premiums, making necessary payouts to depositors as they 
arose, and overseeing liquidation of insolvent banks.9  The Russian government provided initial 
seed capital, while premia (payable quarterly and assessed according to the daily averages of each 
bank’s  insured  deposits)  quickly  became  the  fund’s  main  source  of  financing.  The  deposits  of 
households, not firms, were to be covered. All private banks that accepted household deposits were 
required to participate. All deposits up to 100,000 rubles were fully insured from when banks were 
first admitted into the system in September 2004 until August 2006. From then until March 2007, 
up to 190,000 rubles per deposit were insured, with amounts above 100,000 insured at a 90% rate 
(Camara and Montes-Negret, 2006).10 
By January 1, 2005, several month’s into the system’s operation, 829 banks and a bit more 
than 330,000 deposit accounts, with an average deposit size of 7,000 rubles (roughly $252), were 
insured by the system. Of these accounts, 98.5% were under 100,000 rubles and thus fully insured. 
Two years later, 934 banks and roughly 366,000 deposit accounts, with an average deposit size of 
                                                 
7 Ungan et al. (2008) present similar findings for a slightly later period. 
8A recent geographically representative survey of 1,600 Russians asked “At what annualized inter-
est rate would you refuse to deposit money in a bank because of suspicions as to its stability?” The 
median response of 24.5% turned out to be quite comparable to the real 6% quarterly rate at which 
we earlier estimated the deposit supply curve began bending backward (see National Agency for 
Financial Research 2008 press release “What deposit rate do Russians consider acceptable?”). 
9 The DIA’s board is composed of seven government-appointed representatives and five representa-
tives from the Central Bank of Russia. 
10 Ruble equivalents in dollar deposits were also covered. The insured maximum was again raised at 
the end of March 2007.  Alexei Karas, William Pyle and Koen Schoors   The effect of deposit insurance on Market Disipline: 
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12,000 rubles (roughly $455) were covered by the program. Of these, 99.6% held deposits under 
190,000 rubles and thus were insured at a rate of at least 95.3%.11 Generally speaking, we observe 
rapid growth in personal deposits since the intr oduction of deposit insurance. Much of this growth 
comes from term deposits with maturities between half a year and three years.  Sberbank’s market 
share has eroded somewhat since household deposits became insured and there has been a decline 
in the combined market share of the 30 largest banks, which suggests that the insurance scheme has 
contributed to greater competition within the retail banking market (Camara and Montes-Negret, 
2006; Chernykh and Cole, 2008).12 
Russia was struck by a small banking crisis during the spring and summer of 2004. 13 In re-
sponse,  Russia’s  State  Duma  swiftly  modified  the  arrangements  governing  deposit  insurance 
(Tompson, 2004). Household deposits with failed institutions that were outside the deposit insur-
ance system would be temporarily covered for sums of up to 100,000 rubles. In other words, from 
the middle of July 2004, all household deposits were covered by temporary insurance (Federal Law 
No. 96-FZ).14 The emergency coverage was subsequently replaced with a general deposit insurance 
program for qualifying banks. Banks not admitted to the general program lost their rights to a ttract 
new household deposits and renew existing deposit contracts, and led to progressive erosion of their 
household deposit base.  
 
                                                 
11 These data and updates are posted at the DIA’s website www.asv.org.ru . 
12 Peresetsky (2008) looks at deposit market discipline and the introduction of deposit insurance in 
Russia. Using monthly observations on deposit interest rates at 100 banks between 2004 and 2006, 
he finds evidence consistent with decreased discipline by price.  In contrast to  our study here, he 
does not exploit the natural experi ment potential of comparing household and enterprise deposits 
with each other before and after the introduction of deposit insurance. Instead, he  focuses on com-
paring household deposits before and after the introduction of insurance. 
13 In May 2004, after the licenses of two small banks were withdrawn on charges of money launder-
ing and failure to comply with prudential regulations, rumors began to circulate that the CBR had 
blacklisted weak banks, including several large institutions. This set off a rash of deposit withdraw-
als and liquidity problems at a number of banks. The collapse of a large retail bank in July fueled 
rumors that Alfa Bank, Russia’s largest private retail bank, might be next. Panicked depositors 
withdrew $160 million in deposits (12% of total deposits) from Alfa Bank over a three-day period. 
Rapid policy responses of the CBR and the State Duma prevented a further deterioration of the situ-
ation and the panic abated. Private deposits in the banking system started to rise again shortly the-
reafter (Camara and Montes-Negret, 2006). 
14 Such blanket deposit guarantees have become commonplace (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and Laeven, 
2008) and have been used extensively by governments in their policy responses to the recent global 
financial crisis.  
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4   Data 
 
All Russian banks are required to disclose their financial statements to the Central Bank of Russia 
(CBR). This information is then made available to the public through several channels. Since 1999, 
an increasing number of banks granted the CBR permission to disclose their detailed balance sheets 
and income statements online on the CBR’s website (http://www.cbr.ru/credit/transparent.asp). 
Less detailed bank balances for all Russian banks have been provided since 1998 by the private in-
formation agency Banksrate.ru at www.banks-rate.ru. Banks publish their balances in the financial 
press such as the monthly financial periodical Den’gi i Kredit. Finally, the most detailed informa-
tion on all Russian banks can be purchased from private information agencies.  
The data used in the analysis in Sections 6 and 7 was made available to the authors by two 
well-respected private financial information agencies, Interfax and Mobile. The data consists of 
quarterly bank balances for all Russian banks from 1995q4 through 2007q1.15 The panel of banks is 
unbalanced because some banks fail, some merge, and some are founded during the sample period. 
If a bank is acquired or merged with another bank, we treat the resulting larger bank as a “new” 
bank. 
We use separate measures of a bank’s household and firm deposits, employing them as de-
pendent variables in a manner that is critical to our identification strategy. Not only are the two de-
positor types treated differently under Russia’s deposit insurance scheme, there is the further  possi-
bility that, independent of deposit insurance, the two may differ in their willingness and/or ability to 
discipline deposit-taking institutions (Karas et al., forthcoming). Enterprise managers, for instance, 
might have better access or a better appreciation of the financial information released by banks. 
Similarly, firms and households might face different sets of costs in transitioning their deposits be-
tween banks.  
We measure each bank’s risk level in terms of its capital assets ratio. Models of bank be-
havior have long treated this measure of leverage as directly related to default risk (Merton, 1977). 
More practically, in the wake of the 1988 Basel Accord and the 1996 Market Risk Amendment, 
banks have increasingly favored capital adjustments as the channel through which they manage 
threats of insolvency (Nier and Baumann, 2006). Finally, the capital assets ratio is overwhelmingly 
                                                 
15  For more  information on these firms, see their respective websites at www.interfax.ru and 
www.mobile.ru. Karas and Schoors (2005) provide a d etailed description of the datasets and con-
firm the consistency of various data sources. Alexei Karas, William Pyle and Koen Schoors   The effect of deposit insurance on Market Disipline: 
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the preferred measure for proxying risk exposure in studies of deposit-market discipline (Cook and 
Spellman,  1994;  Hannan  and  Hanweck,  1988;  Park  and  Peristiani,  1998;  Martinez-Peria  and 
Schmukler, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Karas et al., forthcoming). 
As an alternative measure of bank stability, we use its current liquidity ratio, that is, the 
sum of its liquid assets divided by the sum of its liabilities on demand accounts and accounts up to 
30 days. In general, one might expect it to have the same effect as capitalization with respect to 
market discipline as highly liquid banks should be better able to accommodate sudden runs on de-
posits (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). 
Since depositors are hypothesized to react to observable data, these simple measures of 
bank-level stability have the appealing characteristic that they can be easily calculated from pub-
licly available information. More sophisticated measures suggested in the literature either cannot be 
constructed from the available data or do not exist on a comprehensive basis (e.g. bank ratings) over 
the sample period.16  
Our analysis is limited to private banks participating in the deposit insurance program. We 
exclude all state-owned banks, many of which have consistently enjoyed advantages over their pri-
vate competitors: privileged access to state funds, de facto exemption from certain regulations, and 
explicit  backing  for  their  retail  deposits  during  the  entirety  of  the  period  covered  by  our  data 
(Tompson, 2004; Civil Code of Russia, article 840).17 Banks not admitted to the deposit insurance 
program are excluded from our analysis since they were ultimately banned from attracting new 
household deposits and forbidden from renewing existing contracts. Our analysis in Section 6 starts 
from the first quarter of 1999 and concludes with the first quarter of 2007. We use the fourth quarter 
of 2004 as the first post-deposit-insurance observation. 
In conjunction with a period of rapid economic expansion in Russia, the summary statistics 
from our sample banks in Table 1 show robust quarterly deposit growth before and after the intr o-
                                                 
16 Van Soest et al. (2003) report that in October 2001 Fitch IBCA published ratings for only 15 
Russian banks, and that Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s did so for even fewer banks. While Rus-
sian rating agencies provided ratings for up to a hundred banks, their data are not readily available. 
17 The list of state-owned banks was compiled from Sherif  et al. (2003), Matovnikov (2002) and 
Mamontov (2005), and includes banks owned by the CBR as well as banks owned by other go v-
ernment entities or by sub-federal governments. Vernikov (2007) identifies 33 state banks, as do 
we. Most are included on both lists, but ten are different. Some of this may be due to timing; Verni-
kov takes a snapshot of the banking system as of January 1, 2006, while we measure state owne r-
ship in 2001 and 2005. During the interim, obviously, there were new banks established, bank fail-
ures, as well as changes in bank ownership. Moreover, one or both lists could be incomplete.  
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duction of deposit insurance. 18 After 2004, deposits of both firms and households continued to 
grow, but at slightly lower nominal rates. As a share of total banking assets, household deposits shot 
up after the introduction of deposit insurance, rising from 13% to 25%. Over the same period, firm 
deposits as a share of bank assets remained quite stable. 
[Table 1] 
5   Methodology 
 
We apply a difference-in-difference estimator to identify the effect of deposit insurance on the be-
havior of depositors. To our knowledge, this approach has not been used to capture the impact of a 
financial safety net policy on market discipline. Several beneficial features of our data allow us to 
conduct what is in effect a natural experiment. Explicit deposit insurance covering household de-
posits was introduced in the middle of the period covered by our data. The deposit holdings of both 
households (covered) and firms (not covered) are reported separately. We can observe the behavior 
of each group both before and after the introduction of explicit deposit insurance, and we can dis-
tinguish between depositors who receive coverage and those who do not.  
Exploiting these features of the data, a difference-in-difference specification allows us to 
compare the change in market discipline before and after explicit deposit insurance among house-
hold depositors against the corresponding change among firm depositors. Comparing changes, or 
differencing differences, allows us to control for both time-invariant factors that affect households 
and firms differently and for time-varying factors that affect them in a similar fashion. The change 
in the disciplining behavior of firms after the introduction of deposit insurance on household depos-
its is an estimate of the unobserved counterfactual, i.e. what would have happened to the disciplin-
ing behavior of households if there had been no policy of explicit insurance introduced.  
The  difference-in-difference  model  can  be  specified  in  regression  form  as 
 
t j i t i t i t i t i t j i Z IH X b H X b I X b X b D , , 1 , 4 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 , , ) ln(                 (1) 
with the dependent variable being the first difference of the log of deposits of type j (firm 
or household) for bank i during period t. Many studies of deposit market discipline use a measure of 
                                                 
18 Throughout the analysis outliers, with deposit growth below the 0.5 or above the 99.5 percentile, 
are filtered out. Alexei Karas, William Pyle and Koen Schoors   The effect of deposit insurance on Market Disipline: 
Evidence from a natural experiment on deposit flows 
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bank deposit rates as a dependent variable to test whether depositors “demand” a rate premium from 
riskier banks. In light of our work demonstrating a backward-bending deposit supply curve for Rus-
sia (Karas et al., forthcoming), which suggests that the deposit rate itself may be interpreted as a 
measure of otherwise unobservable risk, we elect to focus on market discipline applied exclusively 
through quantities (deposit flows) rather than through prices as well.  
The right-hand-side variables include a vector of bank-level risk factors, Xi,t-1, that varies 
over time and across banks. In our baseline specification, this is a measure of capitalization (Ci,t-1). 
In others, we include a measure of liquidity (Li,t-1). 
The dummy variables, H and I, take on the value of one if, respectively, the observation is 
for household deposits (as opposed to those of firms) and/or is recorded after the introduction of 
explicit  deposit  insurance  in  the  third  quarter  of  2004.  The  coefficient  b4  is  the  difference-in-
difference estimate of the impact of explicit deposit insurance. The vector of controls Z changes 
across specifications. In one, Z=λt+λtH, where λt is a time-specific dummy that controls for time-
varying macroeconomic effects that may have a uniform impact across depositors. The inclusion of 
the interaction term, λtH, allows this common effect to differ depending on whether the depositor is 
a household or firm.   
In a second specification, Z=λt+λtH+μij, where μij is a fixed effect to control for unob-
served heterogeneity in the relationship between specific banks (i=1 …N) and specific depositor 
types (j=household or firm). Lastly, we control for lagged values of the dependent variable by set-




1             . This allows us to distinguish the relationship 
between bank-level risk and market discipline from regular deposit dynamics. 
 
 
6   Results 
 
The results from the difference-in-difference estimations are laid out in Table 2. The specifications 
in columns 1-3 include controls for time-varying factors that may have a uniform impact on all de-
positors of a particular type (household or firm). Those in columns 4-6 include bank-depositor-type 
fixed effects. Models represented in columns 7-9 control for both time fixed effects and deposit dy-
namics in the previous four periods. In columns 1, 4, and 7, our measure of bank risk is capitaliza-
tion alone; in columns 2, 5, and 8, bank risk is proxied for by liquidity alone; and in columns 3, 6, 
and 9, both measures are included. 
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[Table 2] 
We observe that prior to the introduction of deposit insurance, firms were sensitive to bank 
capitalization (see row 1).  This result is robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls.19 Moreover, 
we observe that when controlling for time and bank fixed effects, firms became more sensitive to 
capitalization after the introduction of deposit insurance in the third quarter of 2004 (see row 3, col-
umns 4 and 6). This increase in sensitivity after 2004 is consistent with banking crises providing a 
wake-up call to depositors, causing them to be more vigilant about the stability of their banks (Mar-
tinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001).   
The evidence from rows 1 and 2 furt her suggests that households were sensitive to bank 
capitalization levels prior to the introduction of deposit insurance (i.e., b1 + b2 > 0), but less so than 
firms as we observe that b2 is negative and statistically significant across all specifications. 
Given our focus here, the most noteworthy observation in row 4 is that the difference-in-
difference coefficient, b4, is negative and statistically significant across all specifications but one. 
This indicates that the relative sensitivity of households to bank capitalization diminished after the 
introduction of deposit insurance, and points to deposit insurance having reduced the market disci-
plining behavior of the insured group. It is robust to the inclusion of bank-depositor-type fixed ef-
fects (see column 4), as well as inclusion of a second measure of bank risk, liquidity (see columns 
3, 6 and 9). 
To visualize the temporal pattern of the difference-in-difference coefficient above, we al-
low the sensitivity of firm and household deposits to bank capitalization to be different in each time 
period by estimating: 
t j i t t i t t t i t t j i Z H C b C b D , , 1 , , 3 1 , , 1 , , ) ln(                    (2) 
with Z=λt+λtH+μij. Figure 1 shows how the value of b3, the relative sensitivity of house-
hold deposits drops after the introduction of deposit insurance in the third quarter of 2004 (vertical 
                                                 
19 In columns 3, 6 and 9, we include a list of (unreported) control variables: change in loan quality, 
return on assets, excess reserves as a share of total assets, loans to non-banks as a share of total as-
sets, loans to households as a share of loans to non-banks, term deposits as a share of total deposits, 
and personnel expenses over total assets (see Karas et al, forthcoming, for a motivation of these 
controls). These controls were allowed to enter the equation with different coefficients for firms and 
households and for the pre- and post-deposit-insurance periods.   Alexei Karas, William Pyle and Koen Schoors   The effect of deposit insurance on Market Disipline: 
Evidence from a natural experiment on deposit flows 
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line).20 Moreover, it demonstrates that our finding for b4 in equation (1) is not driven exclusively by 
observations in the periods immediately preceding and/or following this date. 
[Figure 1] 
 
 The evidence here is mixed as to whether the negative coefficient on b4 in equation (1) 
represents a decline in the sensitivity of households to capitalization in an absolute (and not just a 
relative) sense. In the specifications presented in columns 1, 3 and 9, the decrease in sensitivity ap-
pears absolute – b4 is negative and different from zero in a statistically significant manner but b3 is 
not statistically different from zero (see row 3).  Specifications in columns 4 and 6, however, pre-
sent a different story. They suggest that the wake-up call effect felt by all depositors in the after-
math of the crisis had an offsetting effect on the disciplining behavior of household depositors. The 
two effects work in opposite directions and roughly cancel each other out. What is clear is that the 
sensitivity of insured households to bank risk decreased markedly relative to the sensitivity of unin-
sured firms after deposit insurance was introduced.  
 
 
7   Crises, deposit insurance, and market discipline 
 
Any conclusion that we have identified the effect of deposit insurance on market discipline 
rests on an assumption that during the period covered by our analysis there are no time-specific fac-
tors other than the insurance scheme’s introduction that had a differential impact on the two types of 
depositors. The occurrence of a minor banking crisis in Russia, roughly concurrent to the introduc-
tion of deposit insurance, must give pause. Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001), for example, pre-
sent evidence that crisis periods increase market discipline by providing a wake-up call to deposi-
tors.21 If the effect of the 2004 crisis differs across depositor types, then the difference-in-difference 
                                                 
20 It may we be that some households anticipated the introduction of deposit insurance and adjusted 
their behavior before the policy’s formal introduction. The dynamics presented in Figure 1 cannot 
rule out or confirm this. Given that depositors typically do not need a much time to switch deposit-
taking institutions, particularly for the case of demand deposits, we are not overly concerned by this 
possibility. If it is the case that household behavior anticipated the policy, the clean break after the 
formal introduction of deposit insurance is even more impressive. 
21 Using a large cross-country panel data set with banks from 32 countries, covering the period 
1993-2000, Nier and Baumann (2006) show that the effect of variables associated with market- dis-
ciplining behavior is greater in countries that had experienced a crisis. This, they explain, may be  
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estimation we have laid out above fails to disentangle the impacts of deposit insurance and the crisis 
on market discipline. This is a non-trivial matter for reasons that transcend our identification strat-
egy. The introduction or expansion of deposit insurance often occurs concurrent, and indeed in re-
sponse, to banking crises (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and Laeven, 2008).22 Better understanding their 
interaction thus carries potential value for policymakers as they evaluate the costs and benefits of 
financial safety net expansion during periods of systemic instability. 
As we cannot a priori rule out the possibility that household depositors may  react differ-
ently than firms to periods of banking crisis, we return to the Russian data and expand the temporal 
scope of our analysis to include the period before the 1998 crisis. Essentially, these data offer us yet 
another natural experiment. In 1998,  Russian depositors were subjected to a severe banking panic 
but the government did not introduce deposit insurance. In 2004, as we have discussed, depositors 
again suffered through a banking panic, but this time a comprehensive dep osit insurance scheme 
was introduced to cover households alone. The disciplining behavior of households and firms in the 
aftermath of 1998 serves as benchmark for comparing behaviors in the wake of the 2004 events. 
The noteworthy difference in the two episodes, of course, is the introduction of deposit insurance.23  
Both the absolute change of the disciplining behavior of households after the 1998 crisis 
and its relationship to the change in the beh avior of firms serve as an estimate of the unobserved 
counterfactual: What would have happened to the disciplining behavior of households in a rel ative 
and absolute sense if there had been no deposit insurance introduced at roughly the same time as the 
banking panic of 2004?  Evidence that firms responded similarly to the two panics, while  house-
holds responded differently, would be consistent with deposit insurance having affected the beha v-
ior of households. 
To carry out what amounts to an extended robustness check of our finding in the prior sec-
tion, we estimate the sensitivity of deposit flows to bank capitalization, allowing for different sensi-
                                                                                                                                                                  
due to bank franchise values in crisis countries being lower an d risk-taking incentives (in the ab-
sence of market discipline) being higher. 
22 In the midst of the Great Depression, the U.S. Congress enacted the first national deposit i nsur-
ance system. In the 1990s, Sweden, Japan, Thailand, Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia introduced or 
expanded deposit insurance coverage (Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane, 2002). The recent global crisis has 
given rise to a similar phenomenon.  
23 Obviously, the two crises differed greatly in magnitude. Yet, while the number of bank failures 
was minimal in 2004 compared to 1998, the market feared the possibility of bank failures in  2004 
on par with those of 1998. In this context, the introduction of deposit insurance in 2004 may have 
been the policy move that altered the final outcome of the crisis.  Alexei Karas, William Pyle and Koen Schoors   The effect of deposit insurance on Market Disipline: 
Evidence from a natural experiment on deposit flows 
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tivities across the two depositor types and three distinct periods (before the 1998 crisis, between the 
1998  and  the  2004  crises,  and  after  the  2004  crisis).  Specifically,  we  estimate: 
 












1 , 0 ) ln(    (3) 
 
As in equation (1), the dependent variable is the first difference of the log of deposits of 
type j (firm or household) for bank i during period t. The right-hand-side variables include a lagged 
measure of bank-level capitalization, Ci,t-1, that varies over time and across banks and dummies for 
both firm and household deposits for three specific time periods:  F
0=1 and H
0=1 for firm and 
household deposits, respectively, before 1998q4; F
1=1 and H
1=1 for firm and household deposits, 
respectively, for the period between 1998q4 and 2004q3; and F
2=1 and H
2=1 for firm and house-
hold deposits, respectively, after 2004q3. 
As in our first specification above, Z=λt+λtH, where λt is a time-specific dummy that con-
trols for time-varying macroeconomic effects that have a uniform impact across depositors. The in-
clusion of the interaction term, λtH, allows this effect to differ for households and firms. In a second 
specification, Z=λt+λtH+μij, where μij is a fixed effect included to control for unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity in the relationship between specific banks (i=1 …N) and specific depositor 
types (j=household or firm). 
 
[Table 3]  
Panel A of Table 3 reports the estimation results exclusive and inclusive of bank-depositor-
type fixed effects (columns 1 and 2, respectively). In Panel B, coefficient tests present comparisons 
of market discipline across time and depositor types. 
We observe from rows 1-3 of Panel A that firms were sensitive to bank risk across each 
sub-period; coefficient estimates are consistently positive and statistically significant. In line with 
the “wake-up call” hypothesis, the degree of this sensitivity increased in the period after each crisis. 
For instance, when controlling for time and bank-depositor-type fixed effects, we observe that f1 is 
greater than f0 (Panel B, row 1) and f2 is greater than f1 (Panel B, row 4). Using this same specifica-
tion, we do not observe a statistically significant difference in the changes in firms’ disciplining be-
havior in the wake of the two crises (Panel B, row 6).  
Unlike firms, we find no evidence that households were sensitive to bank risk prior to the 
1998 crisis but, like firms, they displayed such sensitivity in its aftermath (Panel A, row 5). In row 3  
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of Panel B, we test the hypothesis that the change in disciplining behavior was the same for house-
holds and firms after the 1998 crisis. The results show that we cannot dismiss this possibility. This 
evidence is consistent with the first crisis having served as a wake-up call for both depositor types. 
 Referring again to the specification with bank-depositor-type fixed effects, household sen-
sitivity to bank capitalization did not change after the 2004 crisis (Panel B, row 5). Whereas the be-
havior of firms in the aftermath of the two crises was not dissimilar (Panel B, row 6), the reaction of 
households was (Panel B, row 7).  We can clearly reject the hypothesis that the sensitivity of house-
holds and firms to bank capitalization changed in a similar fashion after 2004 (Panel B, row 8), a 
result that holds whether or not we control for bank-depositor-type fixed effects.  
In sum, this extended robustness check presents evidence that suggests that the change  in 
the relative disciplining behaviors of firms and households after 2004 was not due to their respond-
ing differently to the banking crisis. We found the sensitivity of household and firm deposit flows to 
bank capitalization rose in an identical manner after the 1998 crisis. After the 2004 crisis, the sensi-
tivity of uninsured firm deposit flows to bank capitalization again rose markedly and in a manner 
similar to the that following the 1998 crisis. The sensitivity of insured household deposit flows to 
bank capitalization, however, remained unchanged or fell after 2004. The early crisis had a similar 
effect on the two groups; the latter crisis did not. We interpret this evidence as confirming the nega-
tive impact of deposit insurance on market discipline.   
 
 
8   Conclusions 
 
Using data from what amounts to a natural experiment in Russia, we provide the cleanest test to 
date on the effect of deposit insurance on market discipline. Employing a difference-in-difference 
estimator to identify the differential effect of deposit insurance on the behaviors of insured house-
holds and uninsured firms, we find evidence consistent with hypothesis that introduction of a credi-
ble insurance scheme diminishes the sensitivity of insured depositors to bank risk. Moreover, com-
paring the relationship of risk sensitivity across depositor types and multiple banking crises, we feel 
confident in dismissing the possibility that our results might be explained by a different reaction of 
households and firms to a banking crisis that hit at roughly the same time as the insurance scheme 
was introduced.  Alexei Karas, William Pyle and Koen Schoors   The effect of deposit insurance on Market Disipline: 
Evidence from a natural experiment on deposit flows 
 
  22 
Importantly, our findings demonstrate the potential for deposit insurance to increase moral 
hazard behavior among banks, and  speak to the combined effect of deposit insurance and crises on 
market discipline. Uninsured depositors respond to a crisis by increasing market discipline, thereby 
providing a potentially valuable check to banks contemplating the assumption of even more risk 
during a period of systemic instability. While we do not claim that newly insured depositors will be 
entirely complacent to bank risk in the aftermath of a crisis, the market discipline they impose will 
clearly be less vigorous than that of uninsured groups. Our results thus could be interpreted to sug-
gest that policymakers exercise caution with respect to any crisis-related expansion of deposit in-
surance lest incentives for already weak banks to gamble on their state-sponsored resurrection be 
strengthened. 
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Table 1  Summary statistics 
  1999q1 – 2004q3  2004q4 – 2007q1 
  Mean  Std. dev.  Mean  Std. dev. 
  Firm deposit growth       0.10       0.54       0.09       0.43 
  Household deposit growth       0.13       0.50       0.12       0.36 
  Firm deposits / Assets       0.35       0.20       0.36       0.18 
  Household deposits / Assets       0.13       0.13       0.25       0.18 
  Capital / Assets       0.30       0.22       0.23       0.16 
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Table 2  Determinants of household and firm deposit flows 
t j i t i t i t i t i t j i Z IH X b H X b I X b X b D , , 1 , 4 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 , , ) ln(              




1              
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
(1) Ci,t-1  0.34**
* 
  0.30***  0.62***    0.58***  0.20***    0.19*** 
  (0.03)    (0.03)  (0.05)    (0.05)  (0.03)    (0.03) 
(2) Ci,t-1H  -
0.23**
* 
  -0.21***  -0.44***    -0.42***  -0.13***    -0.12*** 
  (0.04)    (0.04)  (0.06)    (0.06)  (0.04)    (0.04) 
(3) Ci,t-1I  0.06    0.08  0.25***    0.29***  0.01    0.04 
  (0.05)    (0.05)  (0.06)    (0.06)  (0.06)    (0.06) 
(4) Ci,t-1IH  -
0.18** 
  -0.19**  -0.20**    -0.24***  -0.10    -0.15* 
  (0.08)    (0.07)  (0.08)    (0.08)  (0.08)    (0.08) 
(5) Li,t-1    0.04***  0.02***    0.05***  0.03***    0.02**  0.01 
    (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.01)  (0.01) 
(6) Li,t-1H    -0.02*  -0.01    -0.02*  -0.01    -0.01  -0.01 
    (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.01)  (0.01) 
(7) Li,t-1I    -0.01  -0.02    -0.00  -0.03    -0.01  -0.02 
    (0.01)  (0.02)    (0.01)  (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.02) 
(8) Li,t-1IH    -0.01  0.01    0.01  0.02    0.02  0.03 
    (0.02)  (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.03)    (0.03)  (0.03) 
                   
Observations  54934  54819  54803  54934  54819  54803  44819  44803  44799 
R-squared  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.07  0.07  0.07 
 
Note: D = deposits; C = capital / assets; L = liquid assets / demand liabilities; I = deposit insurance dummy ; H = household deposits dummy 
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Table 3  Crises and the sensitivity of deposits to bank capitalization 












1 , 0 ) ln(  
Panel A. Estimation results  
 
Firm deposit flows 
Coefficient  Z=λt+λtH  Z=λt+λtH+μij 
   (1)  1995q4 – 1998q3  Ci,t-1F
0  0.18***  0.38*** 
    (0.03)  (0.05) 
   (2)  1998q4 – 2004q3   Ci,t-1F
1  0.36***  0.60*** 
    (0.03)  (0.04) 
   (3)  2004q4 – 2007q1  Ci,t-1F
2  0.40***  0.80*** 
    (0.05)  (0.06) 
Household deposit flows       
   (4)  1995q4 – 1998q3  Ci,t-1H
0  -0.04  -0.05 
    (0.03)  (0.05) 
   (5)  1998q4 – 2004q3   Ci,t-1H
1  0.14***  0.22*** 
    (0.02)  (0.03) 
   (6)  2004q4 – 2007q1  Ci,t-1H
2  -0.01  0.20*** 
    (0.05)  (0.06) 
Observations    77678  77678 
R-squared    0.042  0.046 
Note: D = deposits; C = capital / assets; F = firm deposits dummy ; H = household deposits dummy  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Panel B. Hypothesis tests on coefficients 
  Z=λt+λtH  Z=λt+λtH+μij 
(1)  Sensitivity  of  firm  deposits  to  capitalization  pre-  and  post-first 
crisis:F1 – F0 = 0. 
0.18  0.22 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
(2) Sensitivity of household deposits to capitalization pre- and post-
first crisis: H1 – H0 = 0 
0.18  0.27 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
(3) Relative sensitivity of household and firm deposits to first crisis: 
(H1 – H0) – (F1 – F0) = 0 
-0.01  0.05 
(0.92)  (0.50) 
(4) Sensitivity of firm deposits to capitalization pre- and post-second 
crisis: F2 – F1 = 0 
0.04  0.20 
(0.47)  (0.00) 
(5) Sensitivity of household deposits to capitalization pre- and post-
second crisis: H2 – H1 = 0 
-0.15  -0.02 
(0.01)  (0.78) 
(6) Relative sensitivity of firm deposits to first and second crisis: 
(F2– F1) – (F1 – F0) = 0 
-0.14  -0.02 
(0.05)  (0.80) 
(7)  Relative  sensitivity  of  household  deposits  to  first  and  second 
crisis: (H2 – H1) – (H1 – H0) = 0 
-0.32  -0.29 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
(8)  Relative  sensitivity  of  household  and  firm  deposits  to  second 
crisis: (H2 – H1) – (F2– F1) = 0 
-0.18  -0.21 
(0.02)  (0.01) 
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